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Abstract
Socio-economic systems are characterized by the properties of participating individuals and by the struc-
ture of the interactions and relations among them. Not adequately reflecting upon this structure usually
leads to a deficient understanding of both the individual parts, and the system as a whole. Here we argue
that therefore a closer relationship between socio-economics and network science is expedient. But for this
to happen, a common language for the two fields is required. Against this backdrop we discuss examples
of what has been accomplished by studying socio-economic systems with network theoretic methods and
highlight potential contributions of socio-economists to this field. We identify a high thematic overlap in
network theory and socio-economic literature and conclude that both socio-economists and network theorists
could benefit greatly from a closer relationship between the two fields. We highlight, however, the need for
adopting graph theory as a common language.
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1 Why study structuration processes and the dynamics of networks?
Interactions are an essential feature of every socio-economic system. Consequently, socio-economic systems are
characterized not only by the attributes of the individuals but also by the structural properties of the system
into which they are embedded. Not adequately reflecting upon these structural properties of the system usually
leads to an deficient understanding of the processes and entities at the individual and aggregated level, and
consequently of the system as a whole [Gräbner and Kapeller, 2017]. In other words, it is often important to
know who interacts with whom, who owns which company or who are the central actors in a community.1
In this paper, we discuss how an integrative approach to socio-economic networks can address these chal-
lenges. We argue that such an approach should be built upon both social economics and network science.
While social economics has always been concerned with the study of socio-economic mechanisms, the value
base of social norms and institutions, and the relationship between social and economic aspects of society, the
interdisciplinary field of network science has emerged in the last three decades and focused on the empirical
investigation of the structure of natural, social, and artificial systems. We show how these two fields can effec-
tively complement each other in explaining structuration processes i.e. the mechanisms driving the dynamics
of socio-economic networks, and the functioning of complex socio-economic systems.
Socio-economists can benefit from this relation by exploiting the formalisms of network theorists. While
the importance of the interaction structure has been apparent to socio-economists for many years, only the
development of modern network theory provides the means to systematically and quantitatively investigate
network structures. It provides a “language” to describe networks as well as mechanisms and processes operating
on - and through - them (see table 1 and figure 1 for some of the basic vocabulary of this language). Such a
(formal) language is needed by any approach that tries to understand socio-economic problems from a realist
perspective because many important socio-economic mechanisms operate via the structure of relations and
interactions and mere words are not accurate enough to describe these structures adequately.
The new language of network theory allows to ask more specific and concrete questions, such as: “what
kind of relational structure facilitates the emergence of trust among individuals in larger communities?”.
Furthermore, it allows for a whole range of new empirical applications, such as the question of who owns and
leads big transnational companies. Such work helps to identify many empirical regularities that - without such
a formal language - would remain hidden.2
Network theorists could equally benefit from a closer collaboration between the two fields. Network theory
as a mere tool is largely agnostic with respect to causal relationships in the formation of network structure and
mechanisms on it. While network scientists have identified some striking empirical regularities of socio-economic
networks (e.g. the fact that most companies are controlled by a small number of core players [Vitali et al., 2011]),
1[Gräbner and Kapeller, 2017] identified the non-consideration of relations as one of four compositional fallacies that prevent the
understanding of any social system consisting of several parts making up a social ‘whole’. See this article for further meta-theoretical
arguments supporting this claim.
2We introduce several of these regularities in section 3.1.
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they usually have little to say about either policy implications or socio-economic interpretations of these regu-
larities. Also, the theoretical explanations of why and how actors interact and how these processes themselves
can change the network topology are still rather rudimentary and simplistic. Rules, norms, and institutions,
for example, are very likely to play an important role for the structuration of any socio-economic system. Yet
they are barely considered by network scientists. By contrast, socio-economists can provide theoretical contri-
butions on these phenomena, offer missing interpretations of empirical results and motivate further empirical
investigations of rules, norms and institutions. By this they can contribute to a crucially needed mechanismic
understanding of socio-economic networks.
Mechansmic explanations are distinct to instrumental and hermeneutic explanations in that they propose
particular mechanisms that have led to the creation of the network [Bunge, 2011]. By this they provide a much
deeper insight into the system under investigation than the alternative modes of explanation because they not
only illustrate what is the state of the system under investigation, but also why the system is in this particular
state.3 Mechanismic models for social networks represent one key avenue for further research to which social
economists may contribute.
Aside from highlighting the potential of the integrated perspective outlined above, the paper contributes
to the contemporary network literature in at least two more ways: Firstly, we address the intellectual roots of
network research in mathematics, economics, sociology and related disciplines. This provides the foundation
for the potential integration of socio-economic and network theoretical perspectives on networks.4 Secondly,
we identify a number of highly promising avenues for future research at the intersection of these two strands of
research.
Before giving an outlook we will consider the following motivating example:5 Empirical research has shown
that a firm’s positioning in the network of research alliances affects its innovation outcomes [Powell et al., 1996,
Kudic, 2015]. This position is, however, not the only determinant of a firm’s innovativeness: institutional,
organizational, technological, geographical and cultural factors matter as well [Boschma, 2005]. Moreover,
[Whittington et al., 2009] have shown for the US Life Science industry that the above outlined proximity di-
mensions can be independent,complementary or substitutional in their effect on innovation performance: for
a firm, for example, being culturally well adapted to their environment significantly affects the relationship
between network centrality and firm-level innovative performance. This illustrates that in practice it is usually
necessary to integrate the contributions of both network scientists and social economists to understand the
problem at hand.
In the remainder of the article we first introduce the historical and theoretical concepts in the interdisci-
plinary field of network research (Section 2). In Section 3 we then present an overview of structural regularities
and dynamics of socio-economic networks that were identified using the formal language of network science. We
3See [Gräbner and Kapeller, 2017] for a more detailed epistemological and ontological discussion of the concepts of mechanismic
explanations.
4
5You may consult the online appendix for an overview of successful applications of network theory to economic questions.
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conclude in Section 4 with some remarks on limitations of contemporary network research, potential contribu-
tions by socio-economists and fruitful avenues for future inquiry.
2 Theoretical roots of contemporary network research in economics
and related disciplines
We start with clarifying the historical roots of contemporary networks research. We show that networks have
been an important research subject in both the social and natural sciences long ago (Section 2.1). Of particular
importance was the discussion in economics and sociology on the origin of so called hybrid organizational forms,
i.e. organizational forms between the ideal types of markets and hierarchies, that we discuss more closely in
Section 2.2.
2.1 The origins of network research
Structuration and the inherent dynamics of networks was already discussed in early writings in sociology,
economics and other fields, even though the term “network” is often not explicitly used. This section reviews
these early approaches in order to both introduce the constitutional theoretical concepts and analytical tools of
network theory and to clarify the historical origins of contemporary network research. These historical origins
encompass the fields of mathematics, economics, and sociology. We discuss these origins one by one.
2.1.1 A glance over the fence – roots of network research in mathematics
In the early 18th century mathematicians became interested in what later became known as graph theoretical
problems. In its most basic sense, graph theory is concerned with abstract mathematical structures which can
be fully described by limited number of lines (also called ties or edges) between a well-defined set of objects (also
called nodes or vertices) - see Table 1 and Figure 1 for an overview over basic graph theoretic terms and concepts.
The first graph theoretical problem – known as the seven bridges of Königsberg - was solved by Leonard Euler
in 1736. He was able to prove that it was impossible to cross all bridges of Königsberg exactly once.6 Since
then, graph theory has developed greatly with many crucial problems solved and important methods developed
only in the 20th century.
Game theory, also emerging in the 20th century, is another mathematical pillar of modern network theory.
It is concerned with strategic interactions of rational players and develops models that allow predicting – under
very restrictive idealized conditions – the behavior of the sequentially interacting players in the game. The
development of game theory entailed the possibility of models of games on networks.7 Another closely related
strand of game-theoretical literature focuses on the formation of networks [Jackson, 2003, Goyal, 2007]. The
6Or, more precisely, he proved that a graph has a path containing every edge exactly once exists if and only if the graph is
connected and has exactly zero or two nodes with an odd degree.
7An excellent overview and synthesis of such models is given in Jackson and Zenou [Jackson and Zenou, 2015].
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Term Mathematical formulation Explanation
Graph G(V,E) A set of vertices and edges.
Vertex v ∈ V An element of the graph, e.g. a firm oran individual.
Edge e ∈ V × V A connection between two vertices.
Degree δ(v) The number of edges connected to avertex v.
Walk W (v0, vk) A sequence of vertices and edges.
Path P (v0, vk)
A path is a walk where all vertices and
edges are distinct. The length of P is
defined as the number of edges
contained in P .
Distance d(v0, vk)
The length of the shortest path
between v0 and vk. If there is no path
between v0 and vk, then d(v0, vk) =∞.
Diameter diam(G) = max{d(vi, vj)|vi, vj ∈ V } The longest shortest path between anytwo vertices in G.
Connectivity
A graph G is connected if there exists
a path between every pair of distinct
vertices.
Clustering T (G) = #triangles#triads .
A triangle is a set of three different
vertices that are all connected to each
other. A triad is a set of two edges
and one shared vertex.
Table 1: Some basic graph theoretic terminology. For an in-depth introduction see e.g. [van Steen, 2010]
5
A complete network
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Degree
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
The corresponding degree distribution
(a) A complete network and its corresponding degree distribution: all agents are connected to each other and consequently
have the same degree.
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(b) A star network and its corresponding degree distribution: one central agent is connected to every other agent.
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(c) A cycle network and its corresponding degree distribution: every node is connected to his two neighbors.
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A small-world network
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(d) A small world network and its corresponding degree distribution. More important than the degree distribution is
the fact that this network has a small diameter and high clustering.
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(e) A scale-free network and its corresponding degree distribution: there are very few well-connected agents with high
degrees and many agents with low degrees. The degree distribution is heavy tailed and follows a power law.
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(f) A core-periphery network and its corresponding degree distribution: a central cluster of agents is very well connected.
The peripheral agents are connected only to the core of the network.
Figure 1: Some idealized forms of networks and their corresponding degree distributions.
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concepts and models from these two fields turned out to provide a rich theoretical basis for numerical agent-
based simulation modeling which is another powerful tool to study networks, particularly dynamics of formation
and development of networks of higher complexity under less restrictive assumptions.
2.1.2 Networks in economic theory
From today’s point of view, it may seem obvious that economic systems are always built on a social layer of
many interacting entities (agents, firms, and others) and that the microstructure of these systems matters in
various ways for their nature as a whole. But this has not always been the case. Much of traditional economic
theory derives from concepts such as mechanical equilibria in a price-utility system (which effectively eliminate
any importance of the micro-level structure) or the representative agent (which justifies the treatment of micro-
and macro-layer as identical and homogeneous).
Network theory entered economics – well after the fixation of the Walrasian-Marshallian microeconomic stan-
dard – via the study of nonlinear interactions of aggregate concepts such as industries in supply relationships.
These interdisciplinary approaches, e.g. [Goodwin, 1947, Simon, 1953] were soon joined by other traditions
of literature that investigated the role of social networks in economics and of different network structures at
the micro-layer of economic interactions between firms and agents of all kind (e.g. [Bowles and Gintis, 1975]
following advances in sociology, see section 2.1.3). This enabled agent-based models which, based on earlier
Schumpeterian and institutionalist groundwork, were very successful in describing industry dynamics realisti-
cally (see, e.g. [Nelson and Winter, 1982, Arthur, 1989]).
However, the fact that earlier theories did not take network theory into account does not mean that the
respective models are not subject to properties resulting from their implicitly assumed underlying network.
General equilibrium theory, for example, presumes in effect either star networks (with a hypothetical auction-
ator in the center position, see Figure 1b) or complete graphs - which result from the assumption of perfect
homogenity in a hypothetical global market without transaction costs or any institutional obstacles (see Figure
1a). Naturally, not all economists were content with this theory. Institutionalists criticized the lack of represen-
tation of human social reality. Veblen [Veblen, 1898] ridiculed the concept of human nature employed in (in this
case Carl Menger’s) equilibrium theory as ”hedonistic man”; Polanyi [Polanyi, 1944] argued that the economy
was not only embedded in social relations but that the project of equilibrium theory was to disentangle this -
something he argued to be absurd and impossible. Both Veblen and Polanyi understood that socio-economic
systems comprise of and give rise to more complex network structures but the tools to apply this to formal
models were not available at the time both in terms of theoretical concepts and in terms of computation power.
2.1.3 Sociological contributions to network research
The common ground of social network theorizing is the notion that individuals are embedded in social structures.
The explanation of causes and consequences of various types of interrelations among individuals is one of the
key topics in social science.
8
Simmel [Simmel, 1922] already emphasized the fact that the nature of ties among individuals affects their
behaviors in multiple ways. In the mid of the 20th century, sociologists started to employ graph theoretical
concepts to operationalize social structures. One of the pioneers in this research area was Barnes [Barnes, 1954]
who helped coin the term “social network”. The concept attracted a great deal of attention and constituted the
starting point for new research in the field. Several important advances in the theory of social networks date
back to this period. For instance, Milgram’s [Milgram, 1967] letter-passing experiment showed that people in
the United States are separated by, on avarage, only six degrees of separation. That is, the average shortest
path between any two individuals8 is no longer than six interaction steps. The findings and implications
triggered countless research efforts on ”small-world characteristics” in subsequent years (for an overview, see:
[Uzzi et al., 2007] and Section 3).
The social capital and embeddedness literature [Laumann et al., 1978] emphasizes that economic actions
and outcomes are influenced by the context in which they occur. A controversial discussion in social capital lit-
erature arose on whether and to what extent weak ties [Granovetter, 1973, Levin and Cross, 2004] or strong ties
[Uzzi, 1996, Krackhardt, 1992] affect the actors’ behavior and outcomes in social and economic networks.9 Other
seminal contributions [Bourdieu, 1986] paved the way for what we refer to as “closure” theory [Coleman, 1988].
The concept is based on the notion that a network actor’s positioning in a “cohesive” network structure, densely
interconnected and interdependent agents at least at the local level, goes along with several advantages. Co-
hesion is typically assumed to facilitate “the build-up of reputation, trust, social norms, and social control, for
example by coalition building to constrain actions, which facilitates collaboration” [Nooteboom, 2008, p.619].
By contrast, the structural hole theory [Burt, 1992] put forward an efficiency argument and assumes that a
network position to be beneficial when it allows the actor to bridge the gap between two unconnected (or at
least less connected) subgroups of the network. Integrative approaches between these two theoretical concepts
emerged recently [Burt, 2005, Rowley et al., 2000].
2.2 What are inter-firm networks and why do they exist?
In the late 20th century a controversial debate among sociologists and economists arose on the very nature of
hybrid organizational forms. Why do individual economic entities develop decentralized cooperative practices
and do not limit their innovative activities to the hierarchies within the firm or exchange their results on the
market (if there were such a thing as an ideal free market)?
The common ground of traditional economic explanations of hybrid organizational forms is the use of trans-
action cost arguments. In this context, economists [Ouchi, 1980, Jarillo, 1988, Williamson, 1991] have argued
that hybrids are an organizational form positioned intermediately between markets and hierarchies. According
to [Williamson, 1991], the key distinguishing feature of hybrids compared to other forms of governance is a flex-
8The implicit network model in this context is that vertices stand for individuals and edges indicate direct acquaintance or
interaction.
9Granovetter’s [Granovetter, 1973] concept of weak and strong ties was designed to capture the overlap between connected
agent’s direct neighborhood with the strength of the link higher the larger the overlap while weak ties tend to be links to more
distant parts of the network.
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ible contracting mechanism that facilitates continuity and efficient adaptation [Nee, 1992, p.2]. He conducted
a discrete structural analysis in order to compare the three supposed generic forms of economic organization –
markets, hybrids and hierarchies – in terms of governance cost efficiency with regard to the level of uncertainty,
frequency of disturbance, and asset specificity. One of the key findings from this comparative-static analysis
is that transactions characterized by an intermediate level of asset specificity are most efficiently processed by
hybrid organizational forms, i.e. innovation networks [Williamson, 1991, p.284].
Many institutionalists, however, reject the argument since boundedly rational agents acting under true
uncertainty are neither able nor willing to perform these transaction cost calculations [Hodgson, 1993]. An evo-
lutionary argument could be applied (i.e., that they do not optimize their organizational type but evolutionary
selection works in its favor and eliminates other types), but this argument fails to recognize that there is a huge
number of environmental and institutional factors beyond transaction costs that would interfere with such a
selection mechanism.
Sociologists proposed an alternative explanation for the existence of hybrid organizational forms. They
argued that hybrids have to be seen as unique organizational structures and thus should be considered an
organizational form in their own right [Powell, 1987, Podolny and Page, 1998]. According to this line of argu-
ment, the transaction cost perspective fails to see and explain the enormous variety of forms that cooperative
arrangements can take. Powell [Powell, 1987, p.77-82] draws up four factors that explain the emergence, exis-
tence and proliferation of hybrid organizational forms: (I) hybrid organizational forms allow greater flexibility
and adaptability to rapidly changing environments (II) hybrids allow large organizations, which are usually
considered to be structurally inert and thus resistant to change, to overcome, at least to some extent, these
limitations; (III) hybrids provide fast and flexible access to information and knowledge located outside the
firm’s boundaries; (IV) hybrids have to be understood as a variant or application of the “generalized reciprocity
concept” (i.e. individual units do not exist in isolation but rather in relation to other units, cf. Podolny and
Page [Podolny and Page, 1998]) that creates legitimacy, reputation and mutual trust, and thus generates an
efficient and reliable environment for exchange and transfer of information.
The preceding discussion provides very different perspectives on the same phenomenon - i.e. the explanation
of the very nature of hybrid organizational forms such as economic networks. The transaction cost logic does
certainly not capture the multiplicity and complexity of economic network observable in real life; the explanation
of the existence of economic networks cannot be reduced to a transaction cost optimization problem. This is
in line with institutional and evolutionary arguments on the role of uncertainty and bounded rationality in
market processes. The sociological view on networks also represents a contradiction to the transaction cost
perspective. The explanation of the very nature of networks is based on a more comprehensive understanding.
It incorporates several important aspects which are inherently entailed in institutional and evolutionary lines
of argument.
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3 The structure and dynamics of socio-economic networks
Much of conventional modeling implicitly assumes trivial networks: general equilibrium theory, for example,
usually assumes star networks (i.e. one central auctioneer mediating the trades between the other agents, see
Figure 1b), or evolutionary game theory usually assumes complete networks (i.e. a relational structure in which
everyone interacts with everyone else with the same probability, see Figure 1a). One reason for this may by that
before the great advances of network theory in the 1990s, networks were usually not considered an important
feature of a model in economics. But today we know that most real-world networks are described well by neither
star nor complete networks and that this has important consequences. As a result, the well-established practice
in mainstream economics is far too limited.
Section 3.1 offers an overview of the most fundamental stylized facts of real-world networks. Examples
for studies that identify and explain these regularities are summarized in an online appendix to this article.
Section 3.2 discusses dynamics on and of networks in more detail. For examples and applications to problems
in economics, see the online appendix.
3.1 Some stylized facts of economic networks
We focus on empirical results regarding the degree of clustering in economic networks, their diameter and
their degree distribution mainly for two reasons. Firstly, these characteristics received the most attention in
explorative studies and empirical results on their regularities are abundant. Secondly, they represent the most
distinctive properties of economic networks for which empirical results are available. For convenience, we quickly
described all technical concepts used in this section in Table 1 and Figure 1. For a more precise and technical
treatment of the concepts you may consult a textbook on network theory, e.g. [van Steen, 2010].
3.1.1 Clustering
A distinctive feature of social (compared to non-social) networks is their high degree of clustering.The precise
interpretation of clustering depends on the definition of the edges: for innovation networks, for example, , an
edge exists between two vertices if the corresponding firms hold up close research collaboration (no matter how
close they are geographically). Clusters are therefore interpreted in a functional way. Functional clusters are
a common phenomenon, e.g. if one considers cooperation networks among firms [Storper and Harrison, 1991].
Here, clusters are of particular theoretical interest as they tend to “outgrow” the market: close relations among
the different players may be initiated for economic reasons, but after some time reciprocal relationships yield a
higher level of trust. This may be one reason for the stability of industrial clusters.
But there are many other instances where clusters were identified in economic networks, e.g. countries in the
world trade networks form clusters of dense trade relationships with each other [Fagiolo et al., 2010], or banks
in financial markets form clusters of mutual lending and borrowing [Fricke and Lux, 2014].
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In all these cases, the identification of clusters represented a vantage point for more concise models of
the phenomenon under study in which the emergence of the cluster, and its economic importance could be
considered.10
3.1.2 Small-World property
Social networks are not only highly clustered, they are also characterized by short average path lengths.
Networks that combine these two properties, strong clustering and small diameter, are referred to as small
world networks (see Figure 1d).11 It has been an important empirical contribution to show that small-world
networks are common in the economy and to motivate the theoretical question of how these networks emerged
and what their consequences are. Are there common mechanisms causing the network to be so similar in so
different areas? Studies providing potential answers to this questions are summarized in the online appendix to
this article.
Empirical exercises addressing the structure of knowledge transfer networks among firms [Cowan and Jonard, 2004],
firm ownership [Kogut and Walker, 2001], relations among the boards of directors of the biggest US firms
[Davis et al., 2003], the collaboration among research institutes [Cowan and Jonard, 2004], and firm’s research
collaborations [Phelps and Schilling, 2005]. The readers who want to get a good overview over studies that
investigated small-world structures in economics can have a look at the online appendix where we give a
concise overview over the respective studies..
3.1.3 Heavy tails and scaling
As in the case of clustering and diameter, the distribution of degrees in real world networks shows a surpris-
ing regularity: the degree distribution is highly asymmetric with the number of neighbors (the degree) being
inversely proportional to the relative frequency of vertices with this number of neighbors. The resulting distri-
bution is called scale-free, so called as the shape of the distribution remains unchanged no matter which part
of the distribution is considered or whether the network is scaled to some level of aggregation (see figure 1e).
Such information on how degrees are distributed among the different vertices is important because it may hint
at important socio-economic mechanisms operating in the system under study.
Research into network structures of inter-firm networks and other networks in economic systems found that
these networks also were scale-free (e.g., [Kim et al., 2002, Souma et al., 2003, Foster, 2005]). The high proba-
bility of tail events in such distributions is particularly relevant because averaging over large numbers of obser-
vations may not work since the central limit theorem may not be applicable. Risk management relying on such
averaging operations would consequently fail. This is particularly problematic in corporate ownership and corpo-
rate lending networks which have indeed been found to be heavy tailed [Iori et al., 2008, Battiston et al., 2007].12
10The online appendix (page 1) reviews four examples of analyses of spatial and non-spacial clusters in economics.
11The name stems from Milgram’s [Milgram, 1967] famous study according to which every person on the planet knows any other
person with on average only six intermediate steps.
12The identification of scaling laws is not limited to economic networks but was motivated by findings in several other fields
(stock price returns, firm sizes, city sizes, etc., see e.g. Newman, [Newman, 2003]).
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It should be noted that some doubt has been cast in recent years on whether all distributions claimed to
be scale-free actually belong into that category. It is difficult to statistically differentiate between scale-free
(power law) distributions and other candidates including log-normal, exponential with cutoff and less regular
distributions [Clauset et al., 2009, Heinrich, 2014]. The property of heavy tails, however, remains unaffected and
some or all of the implications may also be preserved for these alternative distributions. [Schweitzer et al., 2009]
give an overview over more recent empirical findings and the more recent discussion of heavy tails in economic
networks.13
3.1.4 Core-Periphery structure
Many relevant economic networks – such as lending networks among banks and trade networks among countries
– can more precisely be characterized as core-periphery network.
In its most basic sense, the core-periphery concept is based on the notion of “(...) a dense, cohesive core and
a sparse, unconnected periphery” [Borgatti and Everett, 2000a]. This means that in a core periphery network
basically two types of vertices exist: one group of vertices that are very closely connected (the “core”), and
another group of vertices (the “periphery") that are sparely connected and typically spread across several small
and unconnected components (see figure 1f).
Hence, the core of the network occupies a dominant position in contrast to the subordinated network periph-
ery and the identification of core-periphery structures in real world networks may help identifying important
differences in power among different actors in a network. Rank and her colleagues [Rank et al., 2006], for in-
stance, have argued that actors in the core of a network have a favorable position for negotiating with peripheral
actors in bargaining networks.
Concrete empirical strategies to identify core-periphery patterns were proposed by [Borgatti & Everett, 1999]
and [Holme, 2005] (the latter based on the well known k-core concept of [Doreian and Woodard, 1994]). And
indeed, building on the seminal contributions of Craig and von Peter [Craig and Von Peter, 2010], economists
found, for example, that the lending behavior of banks can be much more adequately described by core periphery
networks than by scale-free networks [Fricke and Lux, 2014].
This empirical finding does not only have descriptive value, it also helps identifying the generative mech-
anisms that bring about such networks of lending and to study potential outcomes of policy measures in this
context. In banking networks, core and periphery elements play different roles in the financial system that
should be taken into account for a reasonable regulation to be implemented.
But core-periphery networks can also be found in very different contexts, such as the German laser
industry sector[Kudic et al., 2015], and supply chains in general [Bair, 2008] and international trade networks
[Fagiolo et al., 2010].14 In international trade, some countries form a center of the trade network and other
countries are connected only to a few of these central vertices, thus being strongly dependent on them. The
identified pattern is very stable over time, including time spans of increasing globalization [Fagiolo et al., 2010].
13The online appendix (page 3) reviews theoretical and empirical analyses of scaling networks.
14For further examples, see the online appendix (page 4).
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It should be considered e.g. in the discussion about the socio-economic consequences of globalization, a
prominent topic in the evolutionary-institutional community: the marginalization of certain countries in such
a trade network both polarizes wealth and capabilities of different countries and does not contribute to overall
efficiency [Fagiolo et al., 2010].
Note that the three stylized facts we have introduced all capture different aspects of networks and are
complementary insights, rather than contradictory: a network can be heavy-tailed, feature many clusters, and
have a core-periphery structure. The various measures tell us different things about the networks, all of which
are important if one is willing to identify the mechanisms having caused these striking regularities.
3.2 Understanding the dynamics on networks
The topology of networks is fundamentally important in economic contexts because the structure of a firm’s (or
an agent’s) environment determines to a large part the risks it has to confront as well as its strategic options
and its potential to use them. It is therefore crucial to understand why there are so many stable regularities of
the social networks we considered so far.
To answer this question one should pay particular attention on what happens on the networks: the devel-
opment of such networks tends to depend on both the decisions of the firm or agent representing the vertices
and their success in surviving immediate threats both alone and in conjunction with their local environment.
Less successful parts of the network will be more volatile or may fail completely and can (in cases in which
persistent regularities emerge) lead to an evolution-like self-organization of the network as a whole. It is ob-
vious that structure and function of properties of the network are interlocked in this case and will co-evolve.
This structure-function relationship is one of the research frontiers of modern network science but it is not
likely that much insight can be gained without a reference to socio-economic theory: it is our hope that once
socio-economists engage themselves with such network-theoretic questions, they may be able to contribute the
missing theoretical mechanisms that make sense of the observed regularities.
One natural approach to model strategic interaction on networks so far is to study games played on graphs.
For simple networks, analytical results on how the structure of networks affects the outcome of games played
are available (e.g. [Kets et al., 2011]) but the effect of complex, empirical networks must usually be studied
via simulations. [Pacheco et al., 2009] for example study how network structure affects the performance of
different strategies in the Prisoners Dilemma. This aligns well with the institutionalist literature on the topic
of economic trust and recognized interdependence, and many complementarities are to be exploited.
Various studies analyzed the emergence of an commodity-exchange equilibrium on networks
[Albin and Foley, 1992, Gintis, 2007, Axtell, 2005] and the emergence of social classes [Axtell et al., 2001] in
bargaining games on networks among other things.
Further, it was found that models from epidemics are well-suited to model information diffusion and tech-
nology adoption (adapted from models of the diffusion of epidemics). A distinguishing factor for such models
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is that diffusion speed depends crucially on the current prevalence of the property in question and the size of
the reachable population as well as the properties of the network. Further, the case of technology diffusion
likely involves network effects which are quite different from global network effects [Arthur, 1989] which are
monopolizing. Local network effects in small-world networks and scale-free networks may, depending on the pa-
rameters of the network, allow for either monopolization or for the persistence of niches of minority technologies
[Uchida and Shirayama, 2008, Pegoretti et al., 2009].
4 A summary, open questions and fruitful avenues for further re-
search
We put forward the argument that a stronger integration of two research domains - socio-economics and network
theory - is the key towards a more comprehensive understanding of the causes and consequences of interactions in
complex socio-economic systems. Both approaches share the notion that all economic processes and outcomes
are accompanied by interaction among individuals. However, the step from single interactions between two
actors towards repeated and more complex interaction patterns bring us directly to the concept of networks,
where at least two constitutional features matters: structure and dynamics.
Over the past decades a rich, and to a large extend quantitatively oriented, body of literature has emerged
that is very instructive on how networks evolve. It provides the formal language and thus the adequate vo-
cabulary to describe and understand the structure of socio-economic systems from a realist perspective and to
identify the structural mechanisms that are driving their dynamics. Today we know that the positioning of
actors in a socio-economic system as well as the topology of the system itself affects the performance outcomes
of the embedded actor in multiple ways. We also know that these outcomes are highly context-specific and
affected by the individuals‘ embeddedness in other spaces, such as regional, institutional, or cultural dimension.
Our discussion of the literature throughout this paper shows how a quantitative approach to socio-economic
networks can help to formulate more concrete questions about the role played by social structure and to identify
empirical regularities in the interaction structure of socio-economic systems.
There are some practical limitations to what can be achieved by quantitative network science. Many of the
advanced techniques require a significant amount of data. For example, there is few data on corporate ownership
networks, trade, and supply networks. Most of it originates from particular contexts or particular time periods
which makes generalization difficult. A similar problem arises for innovation networks. Innovation networks
are frequently inferred from co-patenting data. But this practice is subject to well-known limitations. For
instance, patent applications do not carry any information about the duration of cooperation among the firms.
Consequently, various arbitrary assumptions typically have to be made when working with this type of data.
Data on social and professional networks is scarce for reasons of privacy and the difficulty to gather such data.
In effect, a large number of networks relevant for economics remains completely unstudied and the question of
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whether missing data introduces serious biases into the empirical study of social networks (for example because
more powerful actors are more likely to conceal undesired data) is important and requires further research.
Another promising avenue for future research concerns the dynamics of networks. Quantitative network
science is still in its infancy when it comes to the identification of mechanisms that drive the change of networks
over time. Recent research shows that most frequently applied network change mechanisms (e.g. the preferential
attachment mechanism) provide, at best, a very limited explanation for the emergence of empirically observable
real-world innovation networks [Fricke & Lux, 2016]. A socio-economic perspective could effectively address this
gap of understanding in the following ways:
Firstly, a sound theory of individual decision-making is required to understand the dynamics of social
networks: socio-economic agents do not mechanistically respond to stimuli from their environment. Socio-
economists have developed a rich and interdisciplinary theory of individual decision-making that is firmly rooted
in modern evolutionary theory and instinct-habit psychology [Hodgson, 2012, Elsner, 2014]. The application of
this theory may be able to both close the gaps that exist in current explanations of network dynamics, individual
positioning, and network formation and contribute to our understanding of why the striking empirical regularities
in social networks actually exist.
Secondly, socio-economic systems consist of several ontological levels among which both upward and down-
ward effects play a role [Gräbner, 2016]. Social rules, norms and institutions are prototype examples of struc-
tures that exist on higher ontological levels and both depend upon and affect the behavior of and the relations
among individuals. Therefore, to provide theoretical explanations on the exact role played by these structural
particularities for the emergence and evolution of overall network topologies is highly important.
Finally, the consideration of social networks is likely to have important implications for policy design. The
task of developing good policy measures involves reasoning about several ontological levels: on the micro level,
the structure of individual decision making and interaction among individuals has to be taken into account.
Regulation theorists, for example, should consider ownership networks and coalitions among different business
actors. It may also be useful to think of policies that directly influence the structures of the micro level, e.g.
by strengthening structures that are beneficial to the emergence of trust. The same holds for interactions
among meso-level entities, such as firms, organization, or social groups. Finally, the network structure also
has a profound impact on the macro-level of socio-economic systems (including systemic properties such herd
behavior or systemic risk in financial markets), which may also be considered and targeted by policy measures
[Gräbner and Kapeller, 2017].
Socio-economists may contribute to the understanding on all these levels and their interaction. Most im-
portantly, they can highlight the ethical dimension of public policy and provide the corresponding normative
elaborations. It is essential that socio-economists are involved in these discussions and do not leave the ground
for an allegedly value-free assessment of socio-economic networks and related policy questions. In summary, the
two camps of network scientists and socio-economists have much to offer to each other and a more symbiotic
relationship between them is warranted: network theorists developed a huge set of tools to model networks
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and to identify their empirical regularities. Socio-economists produced a tremendous amount of knowledge
about socio-economic mechanisms that may help to develop the mechanismic explanations of the structure of
the socio-economic systems we see. Only with knowledge of these mechanisms will we be able to significantly
enhance our understanding of the complex socio-economic systems we are, at the same time, interested in and
to work on effective and ethically justified policies for such systems.
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Clustering 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of 
segregation. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, 1:143–186. 
 
- Segregation as result from the interplay and 
dynamics of interactive individual choices 
- Distribution of members in neighborhoods 
defined by reference to their own location 
- Second model deals with compartmented 
space  
- Deals also with ‘neighborhood tipping’ 
- One simulation model and 
one analytic model 
- No simple correspondence of individual 
incentive to collective results 
- Exaggerated separation and patterning result 
from the dynamics of movement 
- Inferences about individual motives cannot be 
drawn from aggregate patterns  
Krugman, P. (1997). How the economy 
organizes itself in space: A survey of the new 
economic geography. In Arthur, W. B., 
Durlauf, S., and Lane, D., editors, The 
Economy as an Evolving Complex System II, 
pages 339-362.Westview Press, Reading, 
MA. 
- Geography of the economy / spatial economy 
as self-organizing system characterized by 
interaction of individual decisions 
- Evolution of spatial economy and emergence 
of spatial structure  
- Illustration and description 
of models and major lines of 
research 
- Discussion of implication for 
future work  
 
Arthur, W. B. (1990). ’Silicon Valley’ 
locational clusters: When do increasing 
returns imply monopoly? Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 19(3):235-251. 
 
- Increasing returns  and dominant markets in 
the context of industrial location 
- Model of industry location: when do 
economies of agglomeration lead to a single 
dominant location monopolizing the industry? 
- Modelling industrial location i) No upper bound to locational increasing 
returns due to agglomeration, leads to a 
clustered dominant location 
ii) An upper bound can produce a monopoly by 
certain sequences of firm entry, or can lead to a 
sharing of industry  
Elsner, W. (2014). Social economics and 
evolutionary institutionalism today. 
Theoretical components and heterodox 
convergence in a socio-economic perspective. 
Forum for Social Economics. 
 
- Theoretical and methodological discussion of 
the constitution of social economics 
- Elements of evolutionary (Veblenian) 
institutional economics are considered 
- Focus on “heterodox” convergence 
- Explanation real-world forms of market, 
hierarchies and spatial clusters 
- Discussion of theoretical 
concepts and methodology 
(complex modeling, game 
theory, computer simulations) 
 
Karrer, B. and Newman, M. E. J. (2011). 
Stochastic blockmodels and community 
structure in networks. Phys. Rev. E, 
83:016107. 
 
- Stochastic blockmodels as a tool for detecting 
community structure in networks 
- Variation in vertex degree and generalization 
of blockmodels which leads to an improved 
objective function for community detection in 
complex networks  
- Generalized blockmodels 
- Heuristic algorithm using an 
objective function or its non-
degree-corrected counterpart 
- Degree-corrected version outperforms the 
uncorrected one in real-world and synthetic 
networks 
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Small World Property 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Milgram, S. (1967). The small world 
problem. Psychology today, 2(1):60-67. 
- Concept and structure of small 
world phenomenon 
- Examination of the average path 
length for social networks (six 
degrees of separation)  
- Experiments with randomly 
selected citizens of the United 
States 
- Social networks are small world networks in which 
in average everyone is six or fewer steps away 
Watts, D. J. and Strogatz, S. H. (1998). 
Collective dynamics of ’small-world’ 
networks. Nature, 393(6684):440-442 
- Characteristics and dynamics of 
small world networks and connection 
topology 
- Neural network of the worm 
Caenorhabditis elegans, the power 
grid of the western United States, and 
the collaboration graph of film actors 
are shown to be small-world 
networks 
- Exploration of simple models of 
networks with rewiring by 
introduction of increasing amount 
of disorder 
- Generating algorithm for 
small-world networks 
- Small world networks can be highly clustered, like 
regular lattices, and have small path lengths, like 
random graphs 
- Enhanced signal propagation speed, computational 
power and synchronizability 
- Infectious diseases spread more easily in small-
world networks than in regular lattices 
Baum, J. A. C., Calabrese, T., and Silverman, 
B. S. (2000). Don’t go it alone: alliance 
network composition and startups’ 
performance in Canadian biotechnology. 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(3):267-
294. 
- Combination of theory and research 
on alliance networks 
- Impact of variation in startups’ 
alliance network composition on 
early performance 
- Analysis of Canadian biotech 
startups’ performance with panel 
data 
- Alliance network configuration at the time of 
founding affect early performance 
- Enhancement of performance by established 
alliances, access to information alliances with rivals 
- Explanation of how and why firm age and size 
affect firm performance 
Uzzi, B. and Spiro, J. (2005). Collaboration 
and creativity: The small 
world problem. American Journal of 
Sociology, 111(2):447-504. 
- Dynamics of small world networks 
- Impact of small world properties on 
performance 
- Analysis of the small world 
network of the creative artists who 
made Broadway musicals from 
1945 to 1989 
- Varying “small world” properties of the systemic‐
level network affects creativity in terms  of financial 
and artistic performance 
Fleming, L., Charles King, I., and Juda, A. I. 
(2007). Small worlds and regional innovation. 
Organization Science, 18(6):938-954. 
- Small-world networks in regional 
context 
- Investigation of the effects of 
collaboration networks on innovation 
- Development and exploitation of a 
novel database on patent 
coauthorship using statistical 
models 
- Existence of regional small-world structures 
enhance innovative productivity within geographic 
regions 
- Shorter path lengths and larger connected 
components correlate with innovation 
Schilling, M. A. and Phelps, C. C.  2007). 
Interfirm collaboration networks: The impact 
of large-scale network structure on firm 
innovation. Management Science, 
53(7):1113–1126. 
- Influence of alliance networks 
structure on potential knowledge 
creation / innovation 
- Longitudinal study of the patent 
performance of 1,106 firms in 11 
industry-level alliance networks 
- Interfirm collaboration networks with short path 
lengths and which are highly clustered have greater 
innovative output 
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Heavy Tails and Scaling 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Price, D. D. S. (1976). A general theory 
of bibliometric and other cumulative 
advantage processes. Journal of the 
American Society for Information 
Science, 27(5):292-306. 
- Cumulative Advantage Distribution is 
proposed which models the situation in 
which success breeds success 
- Modelling Distributions  - Stochastic law is governed by the Beta Function 
containing only one free parameter which 
approximated diverse social science phenomena 
Barabási, A.-L. and Albert, R. (1999). 
Emergence of scaling in random 
networks. Science, 286(5439):509- 512. 
- Emergence of networks  
- Property of large, complex networks: 
vertex connectivities following a scale-
free power-law distribution 
- Modelling scale-free distributions - Networks expand continuously by the addition of 
new vertices 
- New vertices attach preferentially to sites that are 
already well connected 
- Development of large networks is governed by 
robust self-organizing phenomena 
Podolny, J. M. (1994). Market uncertainty 
and the social character of economic 
exchange. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 39(3):458-483. 
- Organizations overcome the problems of 
market uncertainty in selecting exchange 
partners 
- Study of investment banking 
relationships in the investment 
grade and non-investment-grade 
debt markets from 1981 to 1987 
- The greater the market uncertainty the more 
organizations engage in exchanges relations they 
already have transacted in the past 
- The greater uncertainty, the more that organizations 
engage in transactions with those of similar status 
Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., and Hybels, R. 
C. (1999). Interorganizational 
endorsements and the performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44(2):315-349. 
- Examination of the ecological 
consequences of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and acquisitions 
- Focus on how the spatial distribution 
influence the location-specific founding 
rates of new companies 
- Count models of biotechnology 
firm 
- IPOs of organizations located contiguous to or 
within an MSA (metropolitan statistical area) 
accelerate the founding rate within that MSA  
- Acquisitions of biotech firms situated near to or 
within an MSA accelerate the founding rate within 
the MSA when acquirer enters from outside of the 
biotech industry  
- Enforceability of post-employment non-compete 
covenants moderate these effects 
Vázquez, A. (2003). Growing network 
with local rules: Preferential attachment, 
clustering hierarchy, and degree 
correlations. Phys. Rev. E, 67:056104. 
- Linear preferential attachment 
hypothesis as explanation for the 
existence of networks with power-law 
degree distributions 
- Analytical and numerical results 
of different local rules 
- Effective linear preferential attachment is the 
natural outcome of growing network models based on 
local rules 
- Local models offer an explanation to other 
properties like the clustering hierarchy and degree 
correlations 
Ghoshal, G., Chi, L., and Barabási, A.-L. 
(2013). Uncovering the role of elementary 
processes in network evolution. Scientific 
Reports, 3(2920). 
- Identification of elementary mechanism 
and their role on network evolution 
- Focus on formation and deletion of 
connections 
 
- Formulating and solving a model 
with minimal processes of network 
evolution 
- Contribution to growth by formation of connections 
between existing pair of vertices, while others 
capture deletion 
- Dependence of the removal of a node with its 
corresponding edges, or the removal of an edge 
between a pair of vertices 
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Core-Periphery Patterns 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Karrer, B. and Newman, M. E. J. (2011). 
Stochastic blockmodels and community 
structure in networks. Phys. Rev. E, 
83:016107. 
- Stochastic blockmodels as a tool for 
detecting community structure in 
networks 
- Variation in vertex degree and 
generalization of blockmodels 
- Generalized blockmodels 
- Heuristic algorithm for 
community detection using an 
objective function or its non-
degree-corrected counterpart 
- Improved objective function for community 
detection 
- Degree-corrected version outperforms the 
uncorrected one in the real-world and synthetic 
networks 
Hidalgo, C. A., Klinger, B., Barabási, A.-
L., and Hausmann, R. (2007). The 
product space conditions the development 
of nations. Science, 17(5837):482-487. 
- Characteristics and adaption of new 
products 
- Network of relatedness between 
products or “product space” and national 
technology and income level 
- Empirical methods - More-sophisticated products are located in a 
densely connected core 
- Less-sophisticated products occupy a less-
connected periphery 
Holme, P. (2005). Core-periphery 
organization of complex networks. Phys. 
Rev. E, 72:046111  
- Measurement of the core-periphery 
dichotomy for a number of real-world and 
model networks 
- Focus on statistical properties of the 
core and of the n neighbors of the core 
vertices for increasing n 
- A coefficient for the measurement 
of the core-periphery dichotomy is 
proposed 
- Geographically embedded transportation networks 
have a strong core-periphery structure 
- Almost all networks have many edges within n 
neighborhoods at a certain distance from the core 
Doreian, P. and Woodard, K. L. (1994). 
Defining and locating cores and 
boundaries of social networks. Social 
Networks 16:276-293. 
- General procedure for locating the 
boundary of a network and for discerning 
the boundaries within a network 
- First: Expanding (snowball) selection 
procedure 
- Second: specification of two critical 
parameters: the value of k for a k-core and 
the threshold, w, for the quantitative 
magnitude of network ties 
- Single sector and multi-sector 
social service inter-agency 
networks are used 
- Method for locating cores and boundaries generates 
a sequence of nested cores as k and w are 
systematically changed 
Borgatti, S. P. and Everett, M. G. (1999). 
Models of core/periphery structures. 
Social Networks 21:375-395. 
- Concept and formalization of a 
core/periphery structure 
- algorithm for the detection of a dense, 
cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected 
periphery 
- Statistical tests for testing a priori 
hypotheses 
- Different models are presented for different kinds of 
graphs (directed and indirected, valued and 
nonvalued) 
Silva, M. R. D., Ma, H., and Zeng, A. P. 
(2008). Centrality, network capacity, and 
modularity as parameters to analyze the 
core-periphery structure in metabolic 
networks. Proceedings of the IEEE, 
96(8), 1411-1420. 
- Deals with genome-scale metabolic 
networks of organism and their core-
periphery modular organization 
- Focus on hierarchical and modular 
structure of metabolic networks 
Development of method with 
genome-scale metabolic networks 
of five representative organisms, 
which include Aeropyrum pernix, 
Bacillus subtilis, Escherichia coli, 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae, and 
Homo sapiens 
- Proposes a parameter: the core coefficient which 
quantitatively evaluate the core-periphery structure of 
a metabolic network and which is based on the 
concepts of closeness centrality of metabolites and 
network capacity 
